General possibilities

Ori Simchen

in Necessary Intentionality

Published in print January 2012 | ISBN: 9780199608515
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191738241 | DOI:
General possibilities

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This chapter completes the requisite modal metaphysical background to the book’s overall argument. It is argued that general possibilities such as the possibility that there be someone or other typing at some point or other in time, are no less determined by what particular things there are and what they are like than particular possibilities such as the possibility that I should be typing right now. The approach is then brought to bear on a prima facie problem for the position: namely, properties that cannot be had contingently but that happen not to be instantiated by anything.

Keywords: modality; de re; de dicto; essence; actualism

Chapter.  10675 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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