Douglas Ehring

Published in print August 2011 | ISBN: 9780199608539
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191729607 | DOI:

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The main goal of this work is to provide a metaphysical account of properties and of how they are related to concrete particulars. On the broadest level, this work is a defense of tropes and of trope bundle theory as the best accounts of properties and objects, respectively, and, second, a defense of a specific brand of trope nominalism, Natural Class Trope Nominalism. Each of these tasks is pursued separately, with the first Part of this work acting as a general introduction and defense of tropes and trope bundle theory, and the second Part acting as the more specific defense of Natural Class Trope Nominalism. In Part 1 it is argued that there are tropes. Part 1 also provides an outline of what tropes can do for us metaphysically, while remaining neutral between different theories of tropes. Included in Part 1 are an account of the universal–particular distinction, an argument for the existence of tropes based on the phenomenon of moving properties, the development of a trope bundle theory of objects and a trope-based solution to the problems of mental causations. The second Part presents a fuller picture of what a trope is by way of Natural Class Trope Nominalism, according to which a trope's nature is determined by membership in natural classes of tropes. In addition, in Part 2 a defense is developed of Natural Class Trope Nominalism against what have been thought to be fatal objections to this view, a defense grounded in property counterpart theory without modal realism.

Keywords: Natural Class Trope Nominalism; universal–particular distinction; trope; mental causation; bundle theory; property counterpart theory

Book.  272 pages. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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