Chapter

The classic objections to Natural Class Trope Nominalism

Douglas Ehring

in Tropes

Published in print August 2011 | ISBN: 9780199608539
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191729607 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608539.003.0008
The classic objections to Natural Class Trope Nominalism

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This chapter takes up certain key objections to Natural Class Trope Nominalism that have made this position extremely unpopular. The first is the “One Over Fewer” objection. The basic worry is that this form of nominalism seems to rule out the genuine possibility that a property might have had fewer instances than it has. This objection has been pivotal in the rejection of Natural Class Trope Nominalism. The second objection, the “One Over More” objection, is that Natural Class Trope Nominalism also seems to exclude the genuine possibility that there could have been one more, for example, red trope. The third objection, the “Causation” objection, is that Natural Class Trope Nominalism seems to make all properties causally irrelevant by requiring the causal relevancy of non-local tropes for the causal relevancy of any tropes local to a causal sequence. All three of these objections are answered by adopting a counterpart theory of properties without adopting modal realism.

Keywords: Natural; Nominalism; Causation; One Over Fewer; One Over More; Counterpart; Property

Chapter.  14599 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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