Chapter

Reasons, Naturalism, and Transcendental Philosophy

Hilary Kornblith

in Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism

Published in print August 2011 | ISBN: 9780199608553
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191729645 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608553.003.0006
 						Reasons, Naturalism, and Transcendental Philosophy

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There is a view about the nature of human reason which is held by a large number of contemporary philosophers according to which reason somehow eludes naturalization. The position these philosophers favor, inspired by Kant, sees important connections between the possibility of having propositional attitudes, the capacity to have second-order beliefs, the ability to use language, epistemic agency, and the appropriateness of normative assessment. A sympathetic account of the Kantian picture is presented, and a number of empirical presuppositions to which this view is committed are drawn out. It is then argued that these crucial empirical presuppositions are all mistaken.

Keywords: naturalism; reason; reflection; epistemic agency; normativity

Chapter.  10022 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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