Chapter

Deep Assessment and Good Action

Dana Kay Nelkin

in Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility

Published in print July 2011 | ISBN: 9780199608560
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729638 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608560.003.0003
Deep Assessment and Good Action

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In this chapter, the rational abilities view is defended from arguments that the ability to do otherwise is required for both praiseworthy and blameworthy actions. The ability to do otherwise has been thought to be essential for several reasons, including connections to the fairness of blame, to one's being the ultimate source of one's actions, and because it has simply seemed true. In this chapter, variants of each of these challenges is addressed and the rational abilities view is shown to have the resources to answer each. The discussion of fairness of blames leads naturally into questions concerning the fairness of so-called “retributive attitudes,” such as resentment and indignation, as well as the fairness of inflicting harm and punishment, and these questions are also addressed.

Keywords: retributive attitudes; fairness; blame; reactive attitudes; resentment; indignation; harm; punishment; Derk Pereboom

Chapter.  13942 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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