Chapter

Anti-Individualism and Scepticism

Barry Stroud

in Philosophers Past and Present

Published in print June 2011 | ISBN: 9780199608591
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729621 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608591.003.0014
Anti-Individualism and Scepticism

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This chapter explores the ways that a powerful idea is to be developed into a guarantee against philosophical scepticism about the world. Tyler Burge seeks not only what he calls a ‘general’ or ‘transcendental’ guarantee, but something that would justify perceptual knowledge claims in the face of scepticism even in particular cases. He thinks that is achievable even though, in any given case, all of a person's perceptual capacities could be mistaken about how things are. The chapter raises questions about that goal and how it is to be achieved. Is the goal to show that the general possibility of error is no threat to a person's knowing something about the world by perception in a particular case? Or is it rather to show not just that there is no general threat but that philosophical scepticism is actually false, since the person in the case considered does know by perception that things are thus and so? And is this stronger conclusion to be reached by philosophical argument?

Keywords: philosophical scepticism; Tyler Burge; idea; perception; philosophical argument

Chapter.  7380 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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