Chapter

The Skeptical Argument Further Examined: on Resources, Allegedly Overlooked, for Confirming Psychophysical Identities

LaPorte Joseph

in Rigid Designation and Theoretical Identities

Published in print December 2012 | ISBN: 9780199609208
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745027 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609208.003.0008
The Skeptical Argument Further Examined: on Resources, Allegedly Overlooked, for Confirming Psychophysical Identities

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The skeptical argument against specific statements identifying a phenomenal property with a scientific one has been criticized for overlooking two salient resources that would put an end to skepticism, resources that could allegedly be used to establish psychophysical identities. The two resources are scientific induction with correlation and scientific necessitarianism (of which scientific essentialism is a variety). Neither is capable of securing psychophysical identities. The problem is that psychophysical identities lack terms with the right de jure connections binding the terms to their designata by way of conceptual mediation. De jure connections should not be controversial and are not avoided by either the recognitional theory of reference or direct reference. The chapter concludes by embracing scientific empiricism.

Keywords: de jure connection; recognitional theory of reference; direct reference; scientific induction; correlation; scientific necessitarianism; scientific essentialism; scientific empiricism; phenomenal; psychophysical identity

Chapter.  23774 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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