Chapter

Constructivism and Wise Judgment

Valerie Tiberius

in Constructivism in Practical Philosophy

Published in print August 2012 | ISBN: 9780199609833
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191741913 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609833.003.0011
Constructivism and Wise Judgment

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In "Constructivism and Wise Judgment", Valerie Tiberius presents in outline a first order constructivist view that sees all-in reasons as constituted by the judgments of a wise person. Tiberius hopes that her discussion will help to shift the focus in the constructivist debate away from semantic and psychological questions and towards epistemological issues.The paper defends three central claims: 1. Practical questions about what we have all-in reason to do are complex and are therefore best addressed by a theory that is both flexible and capable of incorporating a multiplicity of fundamental values without committing in advance to the content of these values. A theory of wisdom promises to satisfy this demand.2. We can develop a theory of wisdom that would be responsive to theoretical constraints central to the constructivist approach: that the theory be authoritative for all agents, that it be empirically sound and that it be action guiding. 3. A theory that views the output of the deliberation of a wise judge as constitutive of solutions to practical problems qualifies as a constructivist theory.

Keywords: constuctivim; wisdom; epistemology; normativity; judgment

Chapter.  9555 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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