Chapter

Source Incompatibilism

Bernard Berofsky

in Nature's Challenge to Free Will

Published in print January 2012 | ISBN: 9780199640010
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191738197 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199640010.003.0004
 						Source Incompatibilism

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The source incompatibilist view that DR-autonomy (self-determination) is incompatible with determinism is rejected on the following bases. (1) The source incompatibilist demand for a free, self-creating self is seen to be illusory. (2) It is shown that worries about a global controller undermining self-determinism do not transfer to determinism. (3) Robert Kane’s event causal libertarian version of source incompatibilism is rejected because it rests on a prior concern that determinism is incompatible with counterfactual power, an issue to be addressed later in the book. (4) Derk Pereboom’s source incompatibilism is seen to be subject to the identical difficulty—he is really worried that determinism annuls counterfactual power. (5) Randolph Clarke’s agent causation version of source incompatibilism is rejected; but it is conceded that a naturalistic, indeterministic type of control is possible under determinism and is not subject to the luck argument.

Keywords: source incompatibilism; determinism; global controller; event causal libertarianism; agent causal libertarianism; control; luck argument

Chapter.  12395 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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