Chapter

Causal Compatibilism

Bernard Berofsky

in Nature's Challenge to Free Will

Published in print January 2012 | ISBN: 9780199640010
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191738197 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199640010.003.0006
 						Causal Compatibilism

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For a compatibilist, a free agent is one whose decision or behavior is subsumable under appropriate psychological laws. These laws have the same lawmaking properties as laws in the natural sciences. Robust nomological compatibilism, the claim that freedom is not undermined by the discovery of physical determinism, rests on causal compatibilism, the view that psychological laws are not precluded by physical laws accounting for the underlying physical processes. Defenses of causal compatibilism by the Macdonalds, Peter Menzies, Terence Horgan, and Stephen Yablo are all found to be inadequate. A much strengthened version of the generalization argument for causal compatibilism is advanced and Jaegwon Kim’s objections are rejected. A defense of psychological laws is mounted through responses to the objections of John McDowell, John Earman and John Roberts, Philip Pettit, and Ruth Millikan. The theory of Bounded Rationality is advanced as a possible source of psychological laws.

Keywords: psychological laws; nomological compatibilism; causal compatibilism; bounded rationality; Macdonalds; Menzies; Horgan; Yablo; Kim; McDowell

Chapter.  15852 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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