Chapter

Three Important Objections

Michael J. Almeida

in Freedom, God, and Worlds

Published in print August 2012 | ISBN: 9780199640027
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191741937 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199640027.003.0004
Three Important Objections

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It is shown in this chapter that the three well known objections to the free will defense severely underestimate the resources available to that argument. The Problem of Sanctified Agents introduces the modal thesis that, possibly, it is necessary that some essence or other is transworld sanctified. The Problem of Transworld Untrustworthy Agents advances the stronger modal thesis that, possibly, some essence is necessarily not transworld depraved. The Problem of Selective Freedom asserts that, necessarily, God can cause significantly free essences to exemplify the property of selective significant freedom. It is concluded that these three well known objections to the free will defense do not address any serious problem with the argument. The free will defense is a consistency proof. It aims to show that the existence of God is broadly logically consistent with the existence of evil. The best known objections to the free will defense fail to appreciate the number of ways in which the consistency proof can succeed.

Keywords: free will; defense; transworld sanctified; transworld untrustworthy; selective freedom; consistency

Chapter.  13157 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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