Chapter

Unrestricted Actualization, Freedom, and Morally Perfect Worlds

Michael J. Almeida

in Freedom, God, and Worlds

Published in print August 2012 | ISBN: 9780199640027
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191741937 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199640027.003.0005
Unrestricted Actualization, Freedom, and Morally Perfect Worlds

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In this chapter it's shown that, for all the resilience of the free will defense, the thesis of universal transworld depravity is necessarily false. It is a basic assumption in the free will defense that there are two senses in which God can bring it about that an instantiated essence En performs an action A. God can strongly actualize or God can weakly actualize that state of affairs. But there are at least two other senses in which God can bring it about that an instantiated essence En performs an action. God can restricted actualize a world and God can unrestricted actualize a world. Unrestricted actualization ensures that God can strongly actualize a maximal state of affairs T such that, necessarily, T only if God actualizes a morally perfect world. The thesis of universal transworld depravity is therefore necessarily false.

Keywords: defense; strong actualization; weak actualization; unrestricted actualization; perfect world; free will

Chapter.  14587 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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