Chapter

The Logical Problem of Evil Redux

Michael J. Almeida

in Freedom, God, and Worlds

Published in print August 2012 | ISBN: 9780199640027
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191741937 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199640027.003.0006
The Logical Problem of Evil Redux

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John Mackie argued that God's perfect goodness is incompatible with his failing to actualize the best world that he can actualize. And God's omnipotence is incompatible with his being unable to actualize a morally perfect world. Mackie was entirely right. If God predicts that every significantly free essence always goes right only if every significantly free essence always freely goes right. But then Mackie's conclusion follows. But the chapter also offers three Impossibility Arguments which show that it is impossible that, necessarily, God actualizes the best possible world or that, necessarily, God actualizes a morally perfect world or that, necessarily, God actualizes a good enough world. The logical problem of evil is necessarily unsound. It is true in every possible world that God can actualize a morally perfect world, but it is false that, necessarily, God can actualize a morally perfect world only if he does actualize a morally perfect world.

Keywords: John Mackie; logical; evil; impossibility arguments; good enough worlds; best worlds; morally perfect worlds

Chapter.  13936 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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