Chapter

Intuitions in Philosophy: Overview and Taxonomy

Herman Cappelen

in Philosophy without Intuitions

Published in print March 2012 | ISBN: 9780199644865
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191739026 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.003.0001
Intuitions in Philosophy: Overview and Taxonomy

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The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence (Centrality) is widely accepted both in philosophical methodology or metaphilosophy and philosophy at large. This introductory chapter provides an overview and taxonomy of views about what intuitions are and what role they play in philosophical practices such as the method of cases, thought experimentation and conceptual analysis. It outlines two key arguments that can be appealed to in favor of Centrality: the first is based on how philosophers use “intuitions”-vocabulary, and the second on the kind of judgements that philosophers’ make about cases. Part I of the book explores the first argument and Part II the second.

Keywords: intuitions; evidence; thought experiments; method of cases; conceptual analysis; philosophical methodology; metaphilosophy; experimental philosophy

Chapter.  9442 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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