Chapter

Centrality and Philosophical Practice

Herman Cappelen

in Philosophy without Intuitions

Published in print March 2012 | ISBN: 9780199644865
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191739026 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.003.0006
Centrality and Philosophical Practice

Show Summary Details

Preview

Some so-called moderate rationalists such as Bealer present a controversial picture of philosophy: methodological rationalism. In addition to claiming that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence, the methodological rationalist maintains that philosophers seek necessary a priori truths and the method of cases or thought experiments figure centrally in their discovery. A wide range of philosophers opposed to this conception of how philosophy should be done nonetheless consider it—to varying degrees—an adequate description of how philosophy is done. This chapter considers in detail this descriptive picture of philosophy, and offers a taxonomy of different normative attitudes one might have towards it. In later chapters it will be argued that we should not go along with the rationalist in her description of how philosophy is done in the first place.

Keywords: methodological rationalism; moderate rationalism; method of cases; thought experiment; necessity; apriority; Bealer; Bonjour; Weinberg; Kornblith; Goldman; Williamson

Chapter.  5022 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.