Lessons Learned, Replies to Objections, and Comparison to Williamson

Herman Cappelen

in Philosophy without Intuitions

Published in print March 2012 | ISBN: 9780199644865
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191739026 | DOI:
Lessons Learned, Replies to Objections, and Comparison to Williamson

Show Summary Details


Lessons Learned, Replies to Objections and Comparison to Williamson Generalizations about thought experiments are drawn, which underscore the diversity of roles they play in philosophy, and it is argued that philosophers do not implicitly rely on intuitions when they make judgments about cases. It is shown that there is no such thing as ‘the method of cases’. Replies are then presented to a number of objections. The case studies in the previous chapter support the claim that even if there are conceptual a priori truths such as ‘All vixens are female foxes’, they are not relevant to understanding the epistemology of philosophy. This argument contrasts to Williamson’s argument for the same conclusion, which rests on an argument for the claim that there are no epistemically analytic truths. Pace Williamson, the case studies provide no evidence of philosophers “psychologizing the evidence”.

Keywords: intuition; thought experiment; Gettier cases; Williamson; analyticity; evidence

Chapter.  6904 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.