Conceptual Analysis and Intuitions

Herman Cappelen

in Philosophy without Intuitions

Published in print March 2012 | ISBN: 9780199644865
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191739026 | DOI:
Conceptual Analysis and Intuitions

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Those who think philosophers appeal to intuitions when they make judgments about cases also tend to see philosophers as engaged in conceptual analysis when they appeal to cases and vice versa. The case studies considered in Chapter 8 can be used to show that both views are mistaken. Recognition of the marginal (or non-existent) role of intuitions in philosophical practice goes hand in hand with recognition of the marginal (or non-existent) role of anything reasonably labeled ‘conceptual analysis’ in philosophy. This chapter spells out some of the difficulties associated with the view that philosophy involves conceptual analysis and related notions such as conceptual modality. It criticizes possible justifications for being interested in concepts such as their alleged connections to metaphysical necessity and apriority. A number of assumptions needed to reach the conclusion that intuitions are required to engage in conceptual analysis are called into question.

Keywords: intuition; conceptual analysis; conceptual modality; necessity; Apriority; Kornblith; Goldman; Pust; Williamson; analyticity

Chapter.  5515 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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