Agency: The Revised Account

Matthew Stuart

in Locke's Metaphysics

Published in print July 2013 | ISBN: 9780199645114
Published online September 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191760914 | DOI:
Agency: The Revised Account

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This chapter explores changes in Locke's philosophy of action as it is presented in the second and later editions of the Essay. He settles on a single account of volition, and emphasizes the narrow scope of volition. He also offers a new account of motivation, one on which people are moved by present uneasiness rather than the prospect of future good. Locke's remarks about the suspension of the prosecution of desires are common sense observations, not philosophical theory. He also does not take a clear stand on the issue of whether human actions are governed by causal determinism.

Keywords: volition; motivation; uneasiness; suspension; determinism

Chapter.  23299 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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