Chapter

Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Meaning

Allan Gibbard

in Meaning and Normativity

Published in print December 2012 | ISBN: 9780199646074
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191741968 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646074.003.0003
Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Meaning

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Chapter 2, one might complain, departs from Kripke’s “skeptical solution” and seems un-Wittgensteinian in spirit, but it accommodates the considerations that lead to Kripke’s paradox, with examples that clarify its structure. The case in Chapter 2 is extended and analysed. Kripke rejects appeals to simplicity for questions of meaning, but these parallel legitimate appeals in scientific cases. Knowing one’s dispositions couldn’t show me mistaken, Kripke argues. It could, though, indicate, as a normative matter, that one is departing from what one’s proclivities justify. Kripke’s skeptical solution is unnecessary: In judging meanings, we don’t just observe the community; we join in and make the same sorts of meaning judgments as members do, on like bases. These are judgments of truth and not just of assertability, pace Kripke’s Wittgenstein, since what’s assertable with full information is true.

Keywords: meaning; skeptical solution; simplicity; scientific method; dispositions; community; truth; assertability

Chapter.  9390 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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