Chapter

Interpreting Interpretation

Allan Gibbard

in Meaning and Normativity

Published in print December 2012 | ISBN: 9780199646074
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191741968 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646074.003.0009
Interpreting Interpretation

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The metatheory of the book is tested in application to itself. What sorts of plans must one have to believe the metatheory, and do we have such plans? The structure of the metatheory is like that of Brandom. Moore claimed that normative thoughts aren’t naturalistic. The metatheory says what kinds of planning constitute believing Moore, and the metatheory itself. An objection from weakness of will: one can believe one must do something but not do it. The expressivist point is that such a state of mind suffers conceptual incoherence. Nonnaturalism too can recognize this. With conceptually incoherent states of mind, a different concept of mental content from that in the book is needed, grounded in simulation. Simulational meaning allows interpreting a person as conceptually confused, whereas normative meaning figures in what one could believe coherently.

Keywords: metatheory; naturalistic; planning; weakness of will; conceptual incoherence; expressivism; nonnaturalism; simulation

Chapter.  10414 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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