Chapter

Knowing Hearts: Emotion, Value, and Judgement

Katerina Deligiorgi

in The Scope of Autonomy

Published in print May 2012 | ISBN: 9780199646159
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191741142 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646159.003.0005
Knowing Hearts: Emotion, Value, and Judgement

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Chapter 5 returns to some of the issues about motivation discussed in earlier chapters by looking at Schiller’s arguments about the role of emotions in ethics. Re-establishing a link with the historical reception of Kant’s ideas is philosophically valuable for a number of reasons: first Schiller’s criticisms of Kant are interesting and subtle and therefore worth considering in some detail; second, this discussion contributes to considerations of ‘scope’ that are directly germane to the defence of autonomy presented here, by bringing to the foreground two divergent conceptions of ethics, one that is intersubjective and one that is self-perfecting; finally, it offers the opportunity to address from within a historical debate certain contemporary concerns about the role of emotions in ethics. It is argued that emotions can be accommodated within an ethic of autonomy, provided they complement the cognitive and motivational components that make up the theory of autonomy defended here.

Keywords: emotion in ethics; moral education; motivation; play; grace; naive; Schiller; Murdoch; Gibbard; Herman

Chapter.  13816 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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