Chapter

The standing to forgive

Glen Pettigrove

in Forgiveness and Love

Published in print August 2012 | ISBN: 9780199646555
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191741975 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646555.003.0002
The standing to forgive

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Who may forgive? Most philosophical accounts assume that only the victim of a wrongdoing has the standing to forgive. In many cases, this answer to the question is asserted without even an attempt at offering a supporting argument. However, when reasons are offered, they tend to take one of four forms: the debt-cancelling argument, the emotion-based argument, the relation-based argument, or the normative difference argument. In this chapter, these four arguments are shown to be inadequate. In addition, a case is made for expanding the class of those with the standing to forgive to include second and third parties.

Keywords: forgiveness; resentment; indignation; third-party forgiveness; debt cancellation

Chapter.  9437 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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