Chapter

Metacognition and indicative conditionals: a précis

Hannes Leitgeb

in Foundations of Metacognition

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199646739
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745867 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646739.003.0016
Metacognition and indicative conditionals: a précis

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This chapter defends the thesis that accepting an indicative conditional is a metacognitive process that is not metarepresentational. The argument that we give in favour of this thesis is based on (1) the suppositional theory of conditionals, (2) David Lewis’ triviality result on probabilities of conditionals, and (3) Joelle Proust’s account of metacognition. The chapter ends with a list of open questions that we aim to turn to in a more comprehensive study of metacognition and conditionals.

Keywords: indicative conditionals; metacognition; metarepresentation; suppositional theory; probabilistic Ramsey test; acceptance; simulation

Chapter.  8195 words. 

Subjects: Cognitive Psychology

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