Chapter

Metacognitive perspectives on unawareness and uncertainty

Paul Egré and Denis Bonnay

in Foundations of Metacognition

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199646739
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745867 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646739.003.0021
Metacognitive perspectives on unawareness and uncertainty

Show Summary Details

Preview

A state of ignorance about a proposition can result from two distinct sources: uncertainty about what the correct answer actually is, and unawareness of what the answer might possibly be. Uncertainty concerns the strength of one’s evidence, whereas unawareness concerns the conceptual components needed to articulate a proposition. This chapter discusses the implications of the distinction between uncertainty and unawareness for metacognition, and more specifically for the problem of what it takes to know that one knows and to know that one does not know. In particular, this chapter relates the distinction between uncertainty-based unknowns and unawareness-based unknowns to the two-stage model proposed by Glucksberg and McCloskey for decisions about ignorance.

Keywords: metacognition; ignorance; uncertainty; unawareness; positive/negative introspection; implicit knowledge; self-evaluation; imperfect discrimination

Chapter.  12810 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Cognitive Psychology

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.