Chapter

Joint Intention and Group Agency

Richard Ekins

in The Nature of Legislative Intent

Published in print October 2012 | ISBN: 9780199646999
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191741159 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646999.003.0003

Series: Oxford Legal Philosophy

Joint Intention and Group Agency

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This chapter explains how it is possible for groups to form and act on joint intentions, which do not reduce to the sum of the intentions of each member of the group. It begins by making clear, with particular reference to the legislature, why the aggregate of the intentions of each member does not constitute the intention of the group: joint action is not the overlap of individual action. Instead, the joint intention on which the group acts is the plan of action that coordinates and structures the joint action of the members of the group. The chapter considers how complex groups adopt complex plans to act over time, and explores how and why some groups may and should constitute rational agents, which may be expected to act coherently.

Keywords: aggregation; summative accounts; joint intention; group intention; social groups; group agency

Chapter.  12275 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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