Chapter

Why Take Morality to be Objective?

Angus Ritchie

in From Morality to Metaphysics

Published in print November 2012 | ISBN: 9780199652518
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745850 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652518.003.0002
Why Take Morality to be Objective?

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This chapter defends our pre-philosophical commitment to moral objectivism. It is an essential prelude to the main argument, for it establishes the standard which the rest of the book will use to determine which secular accounts are ‘sufficiently’ objective. The chapter defends two distinct claims. The first is that in their practical deliberation, all human beings seek to approximate a truth which goes beyond their sentiments or the conventions of their culture. The second is that this quest is not in vain: which is to say, that humans have some capacity to attune their beliefs more closely to that moral truth, when they honestly and carefully seek it out. It draws on arguments made by David Enoch, Ronald Dworkin and Roger Crisp, and considers the case against moral realism presented by John Mackie.

Keywords: moral objectivism; practical deliberation; moral anti-realism; ethics; Dworkin; Mackie; Crisp; Enoch

Chapter.  11749 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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