From Goodness to God

Angus Ritchie

in From Morality to Metaphysics

Published in print November 2012 | ISBN: 9780199652518
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745850 | DOI:
From Goodness to God

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This chapter develops a positive argument for theism, claiming it is capable (in a way secular accounts are not) of bridging the explanatory gap described in Chapter 2. It begins by defending agent explanation as the a form of teleological explanation. Having argued that theism would be able to explain the reliability of human moral cognition, the chapter goes on to objections to such an explanation by Hugh Rice (who argues against a personal deity, but in favour of teleology) and Stephen Law (who argues an evil God would explain phenomena as well as a benevolent deity, and offers this as a reductio ad absurdum of theism). The chapter defends a personal conception of God, outlines how this might plausibly relate to objective goodness, and argues that Law's ‘evil God hypothesis’ offers a less adequate explanation of human moral cognition.

Keywords: theism; teleological explanation; agency; rice; axiarchism; law; atheism

Chapter.  6495 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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