Chapter

Liberty

Antonia LoLordo

in Locke's Moral Man

Published in print October 2012 | ISBN: 9780199652778
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745478 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652778.003.0002
Liberty

More Like This

Show all results sharing this subject:

  • History of Western Philosophy

GO

Show Summary Details

Preview

Chapter 1 examines Locke's notion of liberty and its connection with his views on power. It argues that Locke conceives of will as the only active power, thinks that superaddition may be the correct explanation of the origin of active power, ascribes active power to animals, and hence denies that active power is a constituent of moral agency. Thus the sort of freedom central to moral agency is not merely the counterfactual dependence of actions on will. Rather, to be a moral agent, one must be capable of suspending the prosecution of one's desires. Some scholars have argued that suspension matters because it enables us to transcend the boundaries of the self or introduces an element of agent causation. This chapter argues that Locke is deliberately agnostic about determinism, and that suspension matters because it's the power of suspension that allows us to be governed by reason.

Keywords: active power; agent causation; animals; determinism; freedom; liberty; power; superaddition; suspension; will

Chapter.  17868 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.