Chapter

Mental Agency and Metaethics

Matthew Evans and Nishi Shah

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 7

Published in print June 2012 | ISBN: 9780199653492
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191741661 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0003

Series: Oxford Studies in Metaethics

Mental Agency and Metaethics

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This chapter argues that none of the traditional anti-realist metaethical views—error theory, non-cognitivism, and constructivism—can fully accommodate certain central features of mental agency. It is also suggested that, in the end, it may be impossible for any metaethicist to accommodate these features and yet still achieve the kind of detached understanding of the practice of normative judgment that every metaethicist would like.

Keywords: constructivism; non-cognitivism; error theory; realism; deliberation; belief; normativity; attitude

Chapter.  13680 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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