Chapter

Rationality, Normativity, and Commitment<sup>1</sup>

Jacob Ross

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 7

Published in print June 2012 | ISBN: 9780199653492
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191741661 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0005

Series: Oxford Studies in Metaethics

Rationality, Normativity, and Commitment1

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Three challenges to the normativity of rationality are considered: the ignorance problem (which concerns cases where we are rationally required to do what we have most objective reason not to do), the wrong kind of reasons problem (which concerns cases where we seem to have overwhelming pragmatic reason to have irrational attitudes), and the mere incoherence problem (which concerns cases where a combination of attitudes is rationally prohibited, and yet we have sufficient reason for each of the constituent attitudes). After criticizing traditional responses to each of these challenges, this chapter offers an account of the connection between rationality and reasons that answers all of them and that has considerable explanatory power.

Keywords: rationality; normativity; commitment; objective reasons; wrong kind of reasons problem; coherence

Chapter.  21632 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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