The Finitary Predicament

Neil Tennant

in Changes of Mind

Published in print June 2012 | ISBN: 9780199655755
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191742125 | DOI:
The Finitary Predicament

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This chapter provides further argument justifying the claim that our use of finite dependency networks entails no loss at all of theoretical generality, as far as belief revision on the part of rational creatures is concerned. Some basic concepts in mathematical logic are defined, to lay the groundwork for the metatheorem, due to Harvey Friedman, that is proved in the next chapter.

Keywords: dependency network; theoretical generality; belief revision; metatheorem

Chapter.  1728 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic

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