Chapter

Reliabilism and the Evidential Constraint

José L. Zalabardo

in Scepticism and Reliable Belief

Published in print July 2012 | ISBN: 9780199656073
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191742132 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.003.0002
Reliabilism and the Evidential Constraint

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The fact that reliabilism makes it possible to know in the absence of evidence has been presented by Laurence BonJour as a reason for abandoning reliabilism. This chapter takes issue with BonJour’s argument. It argues that BonJour has failed to show that there is anything wrong in principle with theories of knowledge that make it possible to know in the absence of evidence. It argues that BonJour’s arguments rely on a highly questionable conception of epistemic rationality and responsibility.

Keywords: knowledge; scepticism; externalism; reliabilism; evidence; reasons; Laurence BonJour

Chapter.  12199 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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