Chapter

Knowledge and Truth Tracking

José L. Zalabardo

in Scepticism and Reliable Belief

Published in print July 2012 | ISBN: 9780199656073
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191742132 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.003.0003
Knowledge and Truth Tracking

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter argues that there are three main respects in which Robert Nozick’s account of knowledge needs to be revised. First, a plausible theory of knowledge must attach much more importance to sensitivity (Nozick’s clause 3) that to adherence (Nozick’s clause 4). Second, truth tracking should not be relativized to the method employed in forming the belief. And third, truth tracking has to be restricted to non-inferential knowledge. Inferential knowledge has to be possible in cases in which the subject’s belief doesn’t track the truth.

Keywords: knowledge; truth-tracking; sensitivity; adherence; methods; Robert Nozick; evidence

Chapter.  14362 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.