Chapter

Sceptical Arguments

José L. Zalabardo

in Scepticism and Reliable Belief

Published in print July 2012 | ISBN: 9780199656073
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191742132 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.003.0007
Sceptical Arguments

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This chapter applies the theory of knowledge developed in Chapters 4–6 to the assessment of sceptical arguments. It shows how the theory deals with the regress argument, arguments based on sceptical possibilities, and the problem of the criterion. It then presents a form of sceptical reasoning that this theory of knowledge can’t block. It concerns the epistemic status of our reflective beliefs about the truth value of our first-order beliefs. It is argued that if the account of knowledge defended in the book is correct, these reflective beliefs can’t be knowledge.

Keywords: knowledge; scepticism; criterion; regress; sceptical hypotheses; reflective beliefs

Chapter.  12232 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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