Scepticism and Realism

José L. Zalabardo

in Scepticism and Reliable Belief

Published in print July 2012 | ISBN: 9780199656073
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191742132 | DOI:
Scepticism and Realism

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This chapter explores the possibility that the sceptical problem presented in Chapter 7 can be blamed on a realist conception of cognition as an activity with truth as its goal, with truth construed as independent of human attitudes. It considers first anti-realist attempts to solve the problem by replacing realist truth with a more accessible belief property as the goal of cognition (e.g. warranted assertibility, consensual agreement…). It argues that these construals of cognition face very important difficulties and that they don’t really solve the sceptical problem. Then the chapter provides a brief sketch of a ‘middle position’ between realism and anti-realism that might provide an attractive construal of cognition as well as having the resources for blocking the sceptical argument.

Keywords: scepticism; realism; cognition; anti-realism; truth

Chapter.  11390 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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