Chapter

Perceiving the Good

Jessica Moss

in Aristotle on the Apparent Good

Published in print July 2012 | ISBN: 9780199656349
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191742156 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656349.003.0002

Series: Oxford Aristotle Studies Series

Perceiving the Good

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This chapter addresses the main objection to the argument of Chapter 1: how can non-rational appetites be for things qua good? It resolves the worry by offering an account of the most basic form of practical cognition, practical perception. Careful study of Aristotle’s view of perception, his notion of cognition, and his account of the good shows, against skeptical objections, that he construes pleasurable and painful perception as genuine cognition of value.

Keywords: pleasure; perception; desire; appetite; cognition; value

Chapter.  14448 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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