Chapter

Nominalism and Divine Aseity

William Lane Craig

in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 4

Published in print August 2012 | ISBN: 9780199656417
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191742163 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.003.0003

Series: Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 4

Nominalism and Divine Aseity

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This chapter argues that if a Christian theist is to be a Platonist, then, he must, it seems, embrace Absolute Creationism, the view that God has created all the abstract objects there are. Those of us who find the boot-strapping problem compelling, however, must look elsewhere to find some solution to the problem posed by the existence of uncreatables. In recent decades there has been a proliferation of nominalistic treatments of abstract objects which has served to make Nominalism an attractive alternative for the orthodox theist. Van Inwagen himself holds that there is rightly a strong presumption of Nominalism's truth which only a rationally compelling argument for Platonism can overcome. Even if we do not hold to such a presumption, the orthodox Christian who is not an Absolute Creationist has grounds for thinking that Platonism is false and therefore has powerful reasons for entertaining Nominalism. Unless all forms of Nominalism can be shown to be untenable, the orthodox Christian can on theological grounds rationally embrace Nominalism as a viable alternative to Platonism.

Keywords: Platonism; Christian theist; Absolute Creationism; orthodox theist; Peter Van Inwagen

Chapter.  11596 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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