Chapter

Wittgensteinian Quasi‐Fideism

Duncan Pritchard

in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 4

Published in print August 2012 | ISBN: 9780199656417
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191742163 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.003.0008

Series: Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 4

Wittgensteinian Quasi‐Fideism

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This chapter offers a moderate fideistic account of the epistemology of religious belief, one that takes on board the account of the structure of reasons offered by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. Like standard forms of fideism, this position holds that the theist's belief in God's existence is lacking in rational support. Unlike standard forms of fideism, however, this position also holds that most religious beliefs can nonetheless enjoy rational support.

Keywords: epistemology; religious belief; reasons; On Certainty; theism; God

Chapter.  8012 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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