Chapter

Basic Normative Properties

Joshua Gert

in Normative Bedrock

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199657544
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191742217 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657544.003.0004
Basic Normative Properties

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This chapter narrows the focus from normative terms generally to normative terms for which a cognitivist semantics seems most appropriate. It offers a particular understanding of the nature of response-dependence, contrasting it with various other ways in which the notion has been understood. It also argues that response-dependent concepts—even non-normative ones such as color concepts—cannot be associated with a priori biconditionals linking those properties with their associated responses unless those biconditionals include some notion of the appropriateness of the response. The resulting view provides a solution to the Wrong Kind of Reasons problem.

Keywords: a priori biconditional; appropriateness; color; properties; response-dependence; wrong kind of reasons

Chapter.  14257 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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