Chapter

Practical Rationality

Joshua Gert

in Normative Bedrock

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199657544
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191742217 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657544.003.0005
Practical Rationality

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This chapter presents a response-dependence account of the basic normative property of rationality. It argues that a certain sort of puzzlement, rather than desire or some other affective response, is the basic response of relevance to this notion. The resulting view helps to moderate the sometimes extreme claims made by advocates of various sorts of motivational internalism about such normative notions as harm, benefit, reasons, and rationality. The chapter also suggests how an account of practical rationality might underwrite an account of morality that makes use of no additional normative notions.

Keywords: harm; motivational internalism; morality; puzzlement; rationality; reasons; response-dependence

Chapter.  13724 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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