Joshua Gert

in Normative Bedrock

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199657544
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191742217 | DOI:

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This chapter exploits the color/value analogy to explain and defend a multiple-aspect response-dependent account of harm on which the appropriate response to a given instance of harm will vary depending on the perspective from which one regards it. The existence of response-dependent properties that have this perspectival nature allows advocates of response-dependent accounts of certain normative properties to reject the question ‘What is the unique fitting attitude to have toward instances of this property?’ Rejecting this uniqueness assumption allows the account of harm to deflect or answer a host of popular objections. It also allows for an explanation of the phenomena associated with incommensurability.

Keywords: color; fitting-attitude; harm; incommensurability; multiple-aspect; perspective; uniqueness

Chapter.  11792 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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