Chapter

A Limited Intuitionist Faculty

Joshua Gert

in Normative Bedrock

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199657544
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191742217 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657544.003.0008
A Limited Intuitionist Faculty

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This chapter suggests one mechanism by which we might be able to come to a priori knowledge about certain relations between the referents of response-dependent terms. And it suggests why this mechanism could underwrite our knowledge about the link between rationality and aversion to harm. This is important, because it seems to be a substantive normative fact that it is irrational to fail to be averse to harm. The result is a limited vindication of intuitionism. But the epistemology defended does not require any new or bizarre psychological capacities; it requires only the same kinds of mechanisms as those by which we have first-personal access to our own beliefs, desires, and other attitudes.

Keywords: a priori knowledge; epistemology; first-personal access; harm; intuitionism; normative fact; rationality

Chapter.  7579 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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