Chapter

Can Descriptivism Account for Singularity?

François Recanati

in Mental Files

Published in print December 2012 | ISBN: 9780199659982
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659982.003.0002
Can Descriptivism Account for Singularity?

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Various attempts to account for singular thought within a (refined) descriptivist framework are discussed and criticized. Rigidity and truth-conditional singularity can be achieved in a two-dimensional framework (with the help of actuality operators), but the relational character of reference determination keeps missing from the descriptivist picture even after the two-dimensional move. It is still missing even if we make the descriptive content token-reflexive by ‘internalizing’ the acquaintance relations and letting them be represented.

Keywords: descriptivism; singular thought; two-dimensional semantics; rigidity; actuality operators; relational/satisfactional; internalization of acquaintance relations

Chapter.  3553 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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