Chapter

Defeasible Properties*

Rafael Hernández Marín

in The Logic of Legal Requirements

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199661640
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745461 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661640.003.0008
Defeasible Properties*

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This chapter argues that defeasibility, far from being an essential feature of legal reasoning, is a highly obscure notion, which has no logical ground and must accordingly be rejected. Moreover, it argues that no logic is possible in the normative domain and that no defeasible logic is justified in the descriptive domain: hence, defeasible deontic logic must be regarded as mere curiosity or nonsense.

Keywords: defeasibility; legal reasoning; defeasible logic

Chapter.  6557 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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