Chapter

Legal Defeasibility and the Connection between Law and Morality*

José Juan Moreso

in The Logic of Legal Requirements

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199661640
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745461 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661640.003.0014
Legal Defeasibility and the Connection between Law and Morality*

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One of the most important questions in recent legal positivist literature is how legal adjudication mirrors the positivist law identification thesis, i.e., what are the legal adjudicative consequences of understanding the nature of law in a certain way? And, particularly, whether the identification of law depends on moral considerations or not. This chapter defends the position that the identification of law can depend on moral considerations, but it need not depend on them. It shows that this conception of the nature of law allows us to obtain an adequate image of the adjudication of law, an image which both fits the legal practice and provides us with fruitful theoretical tools.

Keywords: legal adjudication; positivist law identification thesis; nature of law

Chapter.  7898 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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