Richard Swinburne

in Mind, Brain, and Free Will

Published in print December 2012 | ISBN: 9780199662562
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191748394 | DOI:

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This chapter defends certain principles of internalist epistemic justification, necessary for establishing the theses of the book. It defends the principle of credulity (that—in the absence of defeaters—how things seem to us, including how we seem to remember things, is probably how things are) and the principle of testimony (that—in the absence of defeaters—what other people tell us is probably true). Any evidence that the way things seem or what people tell us not caused ultimately by the things apparently perceived or testified to provides such a defeater. The chapter applies these principles to showing how we determine the logical modality of sentences, and goes on to analyse how what we learn from experience and testimony makes scientific theories probable to different degrees.

Keywords: defeaters; epistemic justification; principle of credulity; probability; testimony

Chapter.  15474 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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