Chapter

Property and Event Dualism

Richard Swinburne

in Mind, Brain, and Free Will

Published in print December 2012 | ISBN: 9780199662562
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191748394 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199662562.003.0004
Property and Event Dualism

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Mental properties and so their instantiations in substances, mental events, are ones to which one substance has a privileged access; physical properties and so physical events are ones to which everyone has equal access. No mental event is identical to or supervenes on a physical event. Mental events include pure mental events (among them conscious events). Pure mental events include beliefs, thoughts, intentions, desires, and sensations. We can have well justified beliefs about the mental lives of others. The chapter ends by analysing in detail the failings of one physicalist theory, that of Papineau.

Keywords: beliefs; desires; intentions; mental events; Papineau; physical events; sensations; thoughts

Chapter.  19313 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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