Chapter

Russell, Wittgenstein, and Synthesis in Thought

Colin Johnston

in Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy

Published in print August 2012 | ISBN: 9780199691524
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191742262 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691524.003.0002
Russell, Wittgenstein, and Synthesis in Thought

Show Summary Details

Preview

Wittgenstein held that Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment fails to explain an atomic judgment's representation of entities as combined. He demonstrated this failure as follows. Under the multiple relation theory, an atomic judgment is a complex whose relating relation is judgment, the universal, and whose terms include the entities the judgment represents as combined. Taking such a complex we may arrive through the substitution of constituents at a complex whose relating relation is again judgment but whose terms do not include entities which are logically suited for combination. This second judgment complex will not represent any of its terms as combined, for entities that are logically uncombinable are unrepresentable as combined. Russell's theory does not, however, explain how the original judgment differs from the complex arrived at by the substitution of constituents such that the former but not the latter represents certain of its terms as combined.

Keywords: Wittgenstein; Tractatus; Russell; judgment; combination; synthesis

Chapter.  10067 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.