Chapter

The Deduction of the Categorical Imperative and the Outermost Boundary of Practical Philosophy

Henry E. Allison

in Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals

Published in print October 2011 | ISBN: 9780199691531
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731808 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691531.003.0013
The Deduction of the Categorical Imperative and the Outermost Boundary of Practical Philosophy

More Like This

Show all results sharing this subject:

  • History of Western Philosophy

GO

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter deals with two issues: (1) Kant’s deduction of the categorical imperative and (2) the bounds of what can be claimed from a practical point of view. The task of the deduction is to explain how the moral law can be unconditionally binding on the wills of finite beings with a sensuous as well as a rational nature. Kant’s argument turns on the proposition that the intelligible world is the ground of both the sensible world and its laws. Although the argument is problematic because it appears to be based on unwarranted metaphysical assumptions, it is suggested that it can be made more plausible, if read in a less blatantly metaphysical way. The boundary question concerns the limits of explanation. Kant claims that we are justified in presupposing freedom and a pure moral interest, both of which are required by the categorical imperative, even though neither is itself explicable.

Keywords: bindingness; categorical imperative; deduction; ground; intelligible world; moral law; practical point of view; sensible world

Chapter.  18384 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.