Chapter

Tackling Berkeley's Puzzle

Quassim Cassam

in Perception, Causation, and Objectivity

Published in print August 2011 | ISBN: 9780199692040
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729713 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692040.003.0002

Series: Consciousness & Self-Consciousness Series

Tackling Berkeley's Puzzle

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It seems that we have the conception of objects of experience as mind-independent. Berkeley argues that it is possible for us to have this conception only if it is made available to us by experience (the Explanatory Requirement) and that experience cannot make this conception available to us (the Experience Premise). John Campbell's response is to reject the Experience Premise on the basis of a Relational View of experience. This chapter criticizes Campbell's response to Berkeley and proposes an alternative response inspired by Kant. This response focuses on the role of the Explanatory Requirement in Berkeley's argument and proposes that when this requirement is properly understood it poses no threat to our possession of the conception of objects as mind-independent.

Keywords: Berkeley; Campbell; Kant; The Relational View of experience; mind-independent objects

Chapter.  8508 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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